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IMPACT OF APEC TRADE LIBERALISATION ON SINO–
AUSTRALIAN BILATERAL TRADE
This paper uses the global trade analysis project (GTAP) model to simulate the effect of
APEC trade liberalisation on Sino-Australian bilateral trade. By comparing the devel-
opment of Sino-Australian bilateral trade in the short run and the long run, the analysis
depicts a whole set of bilateral trade determination mechanisms. The results indicate
that, as economic cooperation within APEC increases, trade between Australia and
China will increase, especially in agriculture and textiles. The bilateral trade pattern may
follow the principle of comparative advantage and the terms of trade may improve for
both countries. The results for the short term are very different from those for the long
term, indicating that bilateral trade in open economies is more than just an ‘external
sector’ affair.
Introduction
In the past 20 years, the Asia Pacific economies have grown rapidly. This growth has been
associated with an increasing level of economic interdependence and market integration
resulting from international trade liberalisation in the region. In particular, intra-regional trade
is now at the highest level in history: by the end of 1999, it already accounted for more than 76
per cent of APEC’s total trade.
With increasing trade flow, bilateral trade has become more and more important.
Appendix Table A1 shows APEC’s intra-regional trade for 1999. The data indicate a concentra-
tion of trade in a few countries. For example, APEC’s total intra-regional trade (153 trade flows)
amounted to about US$365.109 billion; however, 22 per cent of the total (US$81 billion) came
from 10 bilateral trade flows among five countries (Appendix Table A1).1  This suggests that
bilateral trade is a crucial issue for trade liberalisation in the APEC region.
There are three main determinants of bilateral trade. The first is the geographical
distribution of trade, which determines the direction of the future trade flow between the two
countries. The second is the terms of trade. The third is the impact from domestic production
and other trade partners: whether the trading country could obtain the commodity from other
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sources or not. The interaction of the three factors determines the future development of bilateral
trade. Predictions of potential changes in these factors are important for policymakers.
This paper focuses on the trade relationship between China and Australia. A computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model based on the global trade analysis project (GTAP) is used to
estimate the results of tariff cuts in APEC’s early voluntary sector liberalisation (EVSL). I
compare traditional trade theory (partial equilibrium analysis) with the general equilibrium
analysis method and describe adaptations to the model. Then I discuss data collection and model
closure, and outline the procedure for simulation. Next I analyse the results of trade liberali-
sation in the APEC region and the effect on Sino-Australian bilateral trade, explaining the future
composition of bilateral trade from a number of perspectives, including trade flows, trade
structure and trade terms. Finally, I discuss policy implications and present some conclusions.
Theories and modelling
Partial equilibrium theory
Theories about regional integration can be traced back to Viner (1963), who introduced the
concepts of trade creation and trade diversion. Viner used traditional comparative advantage
theory to analyse the effect of European Economic Community tariff cuts on trade flow among
major Western European countries. Critics suggested that his theory placed too much emphasis
on static welfare, and the theory was subsequently revised by many people. The index of trade
intensity model and the gravity model are the most popular revised models.
The index of trade intensity is one of the standard analytical tools in empirical trade
analysis. It was originally discussed by Drysdale and Garnaut (1982) in the context of the
dependency of bilateral trade. Young (1992) used it to analyse trade in APEC, followed by a
related study by Anderson and Norheim (1993). By eliminating the effect of the size of partner
regions from the actual bilateral trade relationships, Young worked out a new index, which
reflected changes in the intra- and extra-regional trade of different countries during the previous
three decades. He concluded that bilateral trade had developed quickly when the Asia Pacific
region was growing into a well-integrated region – a similar situation to Western Europe. This
conclusion was supported by Petri (1992), who reported a higher intra-regional trade intensity
index for East Asia than for other regional integrations.
Saxonhouse (1989) used the gravity model to explain bilateral trade flows by analysing
the interaction between the factor endowments of exporters and importers, based on the
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estimated coefficients of gravity equation. He computed the 1985 data for 43 countries – each
with 29 manufacturing sectors – and found that, out of 2,088 trade flows, only 325 were outside
the tolerance interval. His results indicated that intra-regional bilateral trade in APEC had
increased strikingly, consistent with the predictions of traditional trade theory.
The theories surveyed above explain several issues about bilateral trade before and after
regional trade liberalisation. In particular, they predict the relationship between bilateral trade
and regionalism. However, they have some shortcomings for detailed trade determination. Most
start from the perspective of partial equilibrium analysis, but the structure embodied in this
analysis requires too many strict assumptions. For example, when the gravity model is used to
explain bilateral trade flows, it is assumed that production, consumption and all other
transaction sectors except trade will keep constant. The obvious problem is whether the
discussion will be convincing without taking account of changes in the rest of the economy. A CGE
model is the best way to address such an issue.
The GTAP model
The CGE model has proved to be a powerful tool for policy analysis. The initial neoclassical
version of the model has been modified considerably to incorporate institutional features with
different assumptions; the modified versions include ORANI, IC95 and GTAP, used in different
fields. All have the same basic idea: to associate all sectors in the economy on the basis of general
equilibrium theory, discussing the synthetic result of a shock and mutual relationships across
sectors. In this study, GTAP version 4.0 of 1995, a multi-region, multi-sector model (Hertel and
Tsigas 1997) is adopted. Appendix 1 describes the structure of a standard CGE model.
Four new features of the basic GTAP model are considered here.
First, a comparative static extension that allows capital stocks to be endogenous is
incorporated. This is used when considering the simulation results in the long run. As a
comparative static model, GTAP initially assumes that capital is determined exogenously, so
it emphasises effects in the short run. The model has been modified by Arndt et al. (1997),
Francois et al. (1996) and McDougall and Levesque (1996), but the long run estimations are still
to be improved. Walmsley (1998) compared all the methods previously used for long run
estimation conditions, and developed a new macroeconomy closure based on Horridge and
Powell (1984) and Francois et al. (1997). With the assumption of perfect capital mobility across
time and the definition of a comparative steady state, Walmsley re-split the exogenous and
endogenous variables (or closure) to infer the time frame over which the effect of a shock was
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simulated, so as to reconsider the effect of capital accumulation in the long run. This solves the
problem that the fixed capital in production will change continually across time and improves
the accuracy of estimation under the GTAP model for the long run. I used this idea as the basis
for analysis of the dynamic effect of regional integration on bilateral trade. Appendix 2 describes
the modifications I made.
Second, government investment is separated out from total investment. Government
investment policies are very important in most countries, especially those with large public
sectors. For example, in 1995 Chinese government investment accounted for 30.5 per cent of total
investment, and most government investments were a key to production and trade. In order to
simplify investment decision processes, the GTAP model does not separate out government
investment. Instead, it selects total investment variables, and uses a uniform market price for
a capital good to balance the gross national saving. As a result, government action in the capital
market is omitted. In the following discussion, I try to separate this part by assuming that the
government is an independent ‘sector’ in the capital market, when making the simulation in both
the short run and the long run. By identifying the shadow price of government investment
determined by social welfare, discount rate and real private rate of return,2  I use the constant
elasticity of substitution function to separate total investment into two parts – private and
public investment (Equation 1) – while supposing that the amount of saving is constant.
Furthermore, I add ‘govinvest’ to express the preferred government investment policy – a shock
variable used to simulate impact from government.3  However, I could not split the investment
further by sector because there are not enough data about government investments in different
industries. The equation is:
)](),([)( rQPCGDSrQGCGDSCESrQCGDS = (1)
where QCGDS(r) is total demand for commodity in economy r, which is divided into government
demand, QGCGDS(r), and private demand, QPCGDS(r), following the CES function. The prices
used here are shadow prices and private market prices. This modification is described in
Appendix 2.
Third, the effects of subregion liberalisation are simulated. Subregions are important
components of APEC. Since APEC has adopted the principles of tariff cutting, most countries
have pursued trade liberalisation within their own subregions. For example, for countries under
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), there was free movement of trade
commodities, factor endowments and most services by 2000. If we are to realistically illustrate
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the results of APEC liberalisation, we must take into account the activities of the subregions
before we carry out the simulation for the whole region. I defined the data for the period before
subregional liberalisation as the base term and simulated tariff cuts4  at the subregional level.5
I then simulated further shocks from liberalisation in APEC so as to incorporate the impact of
subregional liberalisation.
Fourth, the final change in bilateral terms of trade into different effects is decomposed
and the process of variation in the complex simulation process is illustrated. According to
McDougall (1997), terms of trade effects resulting from the GTAP simulation can be split into
three parts. The first is the world price effect (caused by the change in the world price). The other
two are the export price effect and the import price effect, both of which denote the impact from
the export country or import country. As shown in Equations 2–5, we can use this method to
decompose the changes in terms of trade in bilateral trade flow caused by intra-regional free
trade into three sources. This helps to explain the determinants behind the formation of bilateral
terms of trade. Consistent with Arndt and Pearson (1996), the left side of Equation 2 is the
bilateral terms of trade in sector i; the right side is the three parts decomposed – the world price
effect, the export price effect and the import price effect. These are explained in Equations 2–5.
Terms of trade: iiii TTTT 321 ∆+∆+∆=∆ (2)
World price effect: 1)1/()1(1 −++=∆ wwii ppT (3)
Export price effect: 1)1/()1(2 −++=∆ wieii ppT (4)
Import price effect: 1)1/()1(3 −++=∆ miwii ppT (5)
Data and simulation
Data
GTAP version 4.0 includes data from 37 countries and 50 sectors. I aggregated the database to
a smaller group, with 7 country groups and 10 sectors,6  because my discussion focuses on trade
liberalisation in APEC countries.
Table 1 shows the re-set of the database used in the calculations. The seven ‘regions’ are
six APEC members and the group defined as the rest of the world. Countries with similar
characteristics are grouped; for example, ASEAN 5 countries are grouped into one ‘region’ (AS5).
Such aggregation will have no effect on the simulation for subregional issues, because I only
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Table 1 Regions, sectors and endowments used in the calculations
Region
CHN China (mainland)
AUS Australia
JPN Japan
AS5 ASEAN 5 countries
NOA North American Free Trade Area
AIC Other Asian newly industrialised countries
ROW Rest of world
Sector
Page Crops
Oage Non-crop agriculture
Mine Mining, energy and non-metallic products
Texe Textiles and clothing
Wppe Wood and wood products
Chme Chemicals
Trne Transport
Mcee Machinery and electronics
Ompe Metallic products and other manufacturesa
Svce Services
Endowments
Nat Sluggish land and other endowments
Lab Mobile unskilled labour
Slab Mobile skilled labour
Capital Mobile capital
Note: a For simplicity, I have added the metallic sector into the other manufactures sector in data
aggregation.
Source: GTAP version 4 database and author’s own calculation.
consider the whole effect in subregions. This simplification does not affect the accuracy of the
model because my analysis deals only with the determinants of bilateral trade between China
and Australia. The sectors include two agriculture sectors, seven manufacturing sectors
(including mining) and one service sector. For manufacturing, this simple division seems too
aggregated, but it is sufficient to reflect the differences among major manufacturing sectors. The
model uses four kinds of factor endowments: natural resources, labour, capital and human
capital. All except natural resources are assumed to be mobile. The government investment and
risk-free return rate data come from International Financial Statistics (IMF 1997).
Trade liberalisation in APEC7  was simulated mainly using the proposed EVSL tariff cut
figures.8  First, I simulated tariff cuts in the APEC subregions and used the results to construct
a new database. The second simulation concerned trade liberalisation in APEC as a whole. For
this, I used the model to provide a snapshot view of the impact of the whole APEC liberalisation
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process. Instead of considering each step sequentially, I condensed the process (from 1996 to
2000) to one static state in order to expose differences. Many changes other than tariffs may be
included in APEC trade liberalisation, but they are omitted in the simulation, for brevity.
Therefore, the results should be treated with caution.
When dealing with the structural indexes between the short run and the long run, I adapted
the method of merging sector divisions in order to make the results comparable at different time
points. For example, to match the shocks from real most favoured nation (MFN) tariff cuts and
the GTAP base data, the electronics sector is combined with machinery as machinery and
electronics. Some information may be omitted by such approximation, but the final results are
not affected.
Sino-Australian bilateral trade and EVSL
Bilateral trade between China and Australia has grown since 1965. Table 2 shows Sino-
Australian trade flows from 1979 to 1999. Bilateral trade grew throughout the period, but most
of the increase occurred after the foundation of APEC. Therefore, my analysis simulated the
effect of further development of APEC, especially the recent EVSL, on Sino-Australian bilateral
trade flow.
At their Subic Bay meeting in November 1996, APEC leaders gave ministers the following
instructions:
To identify sectors where early voluntary liberalisation would have a positive impact on
trade, investment and economic growth in the individual economies as well as in the
region, and to submit recommendations on how this could be achieved ...
By November 1997, cuts in 41 out of 62 nominated sectors were agreed on. Of these, 15
proposals had the greatest support among member economies, and at the Vancouver meeting
these areas were selected for early liberalisation. In brief, the proposal consisted of two tiers,
which cover almost all sectors except the metallic products sector. Most proposals were expected
to be implemented between 1997 and 2000. In the following simulation, I consider the total or
overall change of trade barriers during this period. It is hard to measure variation in non-tariff
measures and other measures, so the proposals I examine in this paper are limited to tariff cuts.
Sectoral details were revised to adapt the figures for the GTAP model.
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Simulation scenarios
I use three simulation scenarios. First, I use the 1995 subregion shock data as a basis for
simulating the 1995 APEC shock in the short run. This is the basic simulation for the revised
GTAP 4.0 database. The results show the effect of trade liberalisation on bilateral trade in the
short run. The shocks are from real tariff cuts.
Second, I use the 1995 subregion shock data as the basis for simulating the 1995 APEC
shock in the long run. By endogenising the capital accumulation, the simulation detects the
effects of the APEC EVSL proposal in the long run. The results reveal many differences between
the short run and the long run.
Third, I use the shock from production factor input variables to simulate the possible sector
structure adjustment in both the short run and the long run.
Table 2 Sino-Australian bilateral trade 1979–99 (US$ million)
Year Exports Imports Total
1979 759.72 184.35 944.07
1980 769.08 239.31 1008.39
1981 640.80 277.86 918.66
1982 766.26 296.25 1062.51
1983 404.67 226.14 630.81
1984 745.39 306.12 1051.51
1985 846.52 285.73 1132.25
1986 957.64 329.07 1286.70
1987 1322.42 501.11 1823.53
1988 1100.26 695.12 1795.37
1989 1462.75 949.00 2411.75
1990 1353.49 1056.62 2410.11
1991 1557.63 1367.06 2924.69
1992 1671.17 1703.52 3374.68
1993 1949.49 1957.48 3906.97
1994 2451.81 2441.09 4892.91
1995 2584.51 2823.91 5408.42
1996 3433.76 3191.27 6625.03
1997 3247.56 3475.57 6723.13
1998 2681.28 3626.06 6307.34
1999 3607.16 4238.78 7845.93
Source: NAPES database, Australian National University.
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The closure for the model in the short run was the GTAP standard closure, with the addition
of the government investment variable. For the closure in the long run, I used the Walmsley
(1998) closure method. The exogenous variables are listed in Appendix Table A2.
Results and policy implications
Results from the simulation capture the effects of APEC regional trade liberalisation on Sino-
Australian bilateral trade, in both the short run and the long run.
Key economic indicators
The first result concerns the key economic indicators resulting from the shock of trade
liberalisation in the short run (static) and in the long run (dynamic) (see Table 3). The results
imply that in the short run China will experience a modest growth in GDP (by 0.82 per cent) and
Australia a decrease (by 0.38 per cent) if other conditions are kept constant. In the long run the
relationship will be reversed: in China, GDP will decrease by 1.87 per cent; in Australia GDP
will increase by 1.31 per cent. In the short run, the shocks will cause China to increase her output
in almost all sectors except metallic products and other manufactures (where there was a 2.14
per cent decrease) and machinery and electronics (a 3.13 per cent decrease), while Australia will
increase only in the agricultural sectors (by 6.48 per cent for crops and 0.90 per cent for non-crop
agriculture) and metallic products and other manufactures (by 0.002 per cent). However, in the
long run, the increased output in China may be mainly from sectors such as textiles and clothing
(15.80 per cent), wood and wood products (by 1.36 per cent), transport (by 4.30 per cent) and
machinery and electronics (by 1.44 per cent), while Australia will increase its output in almost
all sectors except crops (a decrease of 10.94 per cent) and services (a decrease of 0.29 per cent).
Francois et al. (1997) found similar results for Korea.
What is the explanation for these results? One possibility is that the trade effect and the
production effect (the two effects of trade liberalisation) have the reverse impact on the two
economies. In general equilibrium, the trade effect denotes the production improvement from
imported cheap raw materials, services and so on; the production effect denotes a change in
production resulting from changes in production structure and the reorganisation of production
factors (such as capital and labour) in the long run. Here, because the market was relatively
closed before liberalisation, trade liberalisation in the short run may free the ‘surplus produc-
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tivity’ (surplus labour) in most sectors in China. However, in the long run, the division of
production between countries will gradually change according to individual endowments. As
China’s exports increase, the revenue it gets from exports may decrease, leading to reduced
economic growth.9  For Australia, the process is reversed: manufacturing sectors will suffer the
shock from developing countries in the short run, but Australia may earn back its advantage in
these sectors because of its abundant resources.
Trade flow
Another result relates to trade flow and the fact that, both in the short run and in the long run,
bilateral trade will improve considerably after regional free trade shocks. Table 4 shows the
results of my simulation. In the short run, there will be a significant increase in China’s exports
to Australia in all sectors, especially textiles and clothing (16.39 per cent), crops (19.40 per cent)
and machinery and electronics (8.36 per cent). At the same time, Australia will export more to
China, mainly in textiles and clothing (an increase of 36.63 per cent)10  non-crop agriculture (an
Table 3 Output levels: simulation results (percentage change following
liberalisation)
Item/sector                       Static (short run)                         Dynamic (long run)
                        simulation                              simulation
CHN AUS CHN AUS
Crops 0.344 6.477 –9.244 –10.943
Non-crop agriculture 0.302 0.903 –0.260 7.206
Mining, energy and non-metallic products 0.429 –9.182 –18.195 8.410
Textiles and clothing 0.853 –3.034 15.796 7.522
Wood and wood products 0.322 –0.557 1.364 1.187
Chemicals 0.355 –0.545 –2.277 8.534
Transport 1.738 –0.642 4.300 7.358
Machinery and electronics –3.130 –1.168 1.443 6.789
Metallic products and other manufactures –2.138 0.002 1.735 18.114
Services 0.025 –0.041 –2.419 –0.288
Capital goods 0.783 0.738 –7.273 –3.547
Total 0.821 –0.377 –1.871 1.310
Note: CHN=China; AUS=Australia
Source: model simulation.
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increase of 19.42 per cent), metallic products and other manufactures (an increase of 26.73 per
cent) and wood and wood products (an increase of 7.62 per cent). However, in the long run,
Australia will continue to improve export performance in metallic products and other manufac-
tures (by 57.62 per cent), non-crop agriculture (by 49.91 per cent), mining, energy and non-
metallic products (by 76.29 per cent) and chemicals (by 13.45 per cent),11  while China will
increase exports in textiles and clothing (by 28.22 per cent), wood and wood products (by 30.14
per cent) and machinery and electronics (by 20.95 per cent), although the rate of improvement
will decrease.
Trade potential in the short run
The rapid growth of Sino-Australian bilateral trade as a result of APEC trade liberalisation
suggests that there is great potential for trade between China and Australia. Trade theory
distinguishes two sorts of trade: inter-industry trade and intra-industry trade. Sino-Australian
bilateral trade combines the two sorts of trade. The inter-industry trade between Australian
resource-intensive industries and Chinese labour-intensive industries is increasing; in most
sectors the intra-industry trade is also developing quickly. For example, as shown in Table 4,
Table 4 Sino-Australian bilateral trade: changes in exports (per cent)
Item                             Short run simulation                     Long run simulation
AUS-CHN CHN-AUS AUS-CHN CHN-AUS
Crops 19.417 19.404 19.297 –126.389
Non-crop agriculture 30.862 9.010 49.913 –23.295
Mining, energy and non-metallic
products –15.690 14.084 76.292 –166.739
Textiles and clothing 36.627 16.385 58.339 28.224
Wood and wood products 7.617 18.577 4.549 30.137
Chemicals –2.755 2.553 13.451 –9.890
Transport 14.503 12.757 31.609 26.257
Machinery and electronics 32.738 8.361 37.435 20.951
Metallic products and other
manufactures 26.726 5.782 57.619 9.876
Services –1.749 1.543 –4.888 12.973
Note: CHN=China; AUS=Australia
Source: GTAP model simulation.
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in the short run Australia will increase its exports to China by 30.86 per cent in non-crop
agriculture and 36.63 per cent in textiles and clothing, while in these sectors China will increase
her exports to Australia by 9.01 per cent and 16.39 per cent respectively. We can conclude that
the potential for trade between China and Australia not only is large but also is taking multiple
directions, which will provide bilateral trade with continuing impetus. As Findlay and Chen
(2000) have argued, the exchange of food for food products and wool for woollen products may
become the trend for Sino-Australian bilateral trade in the next several years.
Comparative advantages
Comparative advantages will be reflected in Sino-Australia bilateral trade in the long run. The
simulation shows (Table 4) that Australia will considerably increase exports in sectors such as
mining, energy and non-metallic products (by 76.29 per cent), textiles and clothing (by 58.34 per
cent), wood and wood products (by 4.55 per cent), metallic products and other manufactures (by
57.62 per cent) and non-crop agriculture (by 49.91 per cent); China will expand her exports to
Australia in textiles and clothing (by 28.22 per cent), wood and wood products (by 30.14 per cent),
machinery and electronics (by 20.95 per cent) and metallic products and other manufactures (by
9.87 per cent). The results are consistent with the principle of comparative advantage. For
Australia, bilateral trade growth in mining, textiles and clothing and non-crop agriculture is
even higher than that of Australian total exports, which implies a biased trend towards China.
In the long term, it is obvious that Sino-Australian bilateral trade will be a kind of complemen-
tary trade.
Terms of trade
The simulation shows that the terms of trade between China and Australia will change greatly
following the shocks from trade liberalisation in APEC. Table 5 shows these changes. In the short
run, to some extent, the growth of bilateral trade leads to increases in the relative prices for
imports in China and exports in Australia, but in most sectors in China the terms of trade are
worsened, while for Australia they are improved. In the long run, as the relative price comes down
slowly, terms of trade in different sectors of different countries will take different directions.
Specifically, China will improve its terms of trade in crops (by 27.43 per cent), mining, energy
and non-metallic products (by 44.40 per cent) and chemicals (by 5.06 per cent), while Australia
13
No. 330  August 2002
will worsen its terms of trade in wood and wood products (by 2.80 per cent), services (by 2.72 per
cent) and so on (see Table 5). When this is combined with simulation results for trade volume,
both countries will obtain trade surpluses from total trade in the long run, although Australia
may have a trade deficit in the short run.
Furthermore, the decomposition results of the bilateral terms of trade effects according
to Equations 2–5 indicate that after trade liberalisation export relative prices in different
sectors change for different reasons. For example, in the short run, the worsening of bilateral
Table 5 Changes in the terms of trade: short run and long run (per cent)
                   Australia to China            China to Australia Term Term
FOB CIF FOB CIF  AUS CHN
Short run
Crops 5.354 5.104 1.496 1.413 3.886 –3.432
Non-crop agriculture 2.693 2.597 1.200 1.1465 1.529 –1.363
Mining, energy and non-metallic
products 5.281 4.684 0.220 0.219 5.051 –4.264
Textiles and clothing 0.562 0.541 –2.182 –2.057 2.674 –2.708
Wood and wood products 0.345 0.340 –0.821 –0.771 1.125 –1.157
Chemicals 1.269 1.154 –0.226 –0.194 1.465 –1.364
Transport 0.437 0.430 –0.986 –0.959 1.409 –1.410
Machinery and electronics 0.454 0.446 –1.550 –1.492 1.975 –1.987
Metallic products and other
manufactures 1.101 1.064 –0.850 –0.800 1.916 –1.893
Services 0.480 0.480 –0.097 –0.097 0.578 –0.574
Long run
Crops –33.184 –31.540 –12.758 –11.893 –24.166 27.435
Non-crop agriculture –16.288 –15.636 –10.202 –9.620 –7.378 6.441
Mining, energy and non-metallic
products –41.492 –36.530 –8.348 –7.615 –36.669 44.401
Textiles and clothing –5.414 –5.061 –7.538 –7.110 1.827 –2.609
Wood and wood products –2.016 –1.903 –4.964 –4.689 2.804 –3.120
Chemicals –11.323 –10.027 –5.473 –5.021 –6.636 5.061
Transport –2.419 –2.329 –3.220 –3.134 0.738 –0.912
Machinery and electronics –1.703 –1.630 –4.104 –3.945 2.334 –2.515
Metallic products and other
manufactures –7.082 –6.761 –4.651 –4.401 –2.804 2.263
Services –0.600 –0.600 –3.234 –3.234 2.722 –2.650
Note: CHN=China; AUS=Australia; FOB= free on board; CIF= cost, insurance and freight.
Source: GTAP model simulation.
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terms of trade in the Chinese textiles and clothing sector (by 2.71 per cent) is mainly caused by
the export terms of trade effect.12  In the long run, the terms of trade worsened by about the same
amount (2.61 per cent) but in this case it was due to terms of trade effects for both exports and
imports – competition from other countries and the ‘Rybcyznski effect’ as well as the rapid
increase in domestic demand. Another example concerns Australian exports to China in wood
and wood products and chemicals in the short run. In both cases, the export relative price is more
than 1 per cent (chemicals, 1.47 per cent; wood and wood products, 1.12 per cent), but the increase
in the former results from the world price effect13  while the latter results from technological
progress.14  We cannot judge the impact of regionalism on bilateral terms of trade only by changes
in the import–export relative price, but must take the specific situation into account.
Generally, the effect of the import price is greater in the short run; that of the export price
is greater in the long run. In addition, the world price effect is dominant in the primary sectors,
while the border price effect is dominant in advanced sectors.
Structural adjustment indexes
Table 6 shows that there are differences in measurements of sector structural adjustment
indexes. The results of the simulation show that for China, before the shock of trade liberali-
sation, production structure in manufactures would change positively with an increasing supply
of endowments, but that the reverse is the case for agriculture and mining.15  For Australia, the
indexes would change positively in most sectors and would be much higher. However, after
regional trade liberalisation, the changes in the structural indexes represent a new trend. For
example, before tariff cuts the structural adjustment index of human capital in manufacturing
in China was quite low; after trade liberalisation, it increased considerably. This implies that
trade liberalisation in the APEC region has helped to improve the distribution of human capital
in manufacturing.
Public investment
Public investment in China has an important effect on production and trade (Table 7). In
particular, for sectoral production, the positive effects of Chinese public investment are now
mainly in manufactures: transport (0.48 per cent), machinery and electronics (0.42 per cent) and
textiles and clothing (0.23 per cent). For agriculture and other sectors, the impact of public
investment is almost negligible, or even negative, reflecting policy orientation.
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Conclusions
Sino-Australian bilateral trade has experienced rapid growth and is an important component
of intra-regional trade in APEC. As trade cooperation among APEC members continues, China
and Australia will have even more trade potential. The analysis described in this paper shows
that Sino-Australian bilateral trade is likely to increase greatly under regional trade liberali-
sation. By taking advantage of the current conditions and by using individual comparative
advantage, China and Australia can promote the development of both economies.
Table 6 Sector structural adjustment index
CHN AUS
Labour Capital Slab Labour Capital Slab
Before trade liberalisation
Crops –1.968 –0.179 –0.031 0.264 1.415  0.135
Non-crop agriculture –1.046 –0.090 –0.018 0.712 1.051  0.446
Mining, energy and non-metallic
products –1.716 0.320 0.047 –0.498 1.928 –0.145
Textiles and clothing 0.646 0.672 0.136 1.969 1.533 1.260
Wood and wood products 0.727 0.486 0.827 0.641 0.522 0.414
Chemicals 0.284 0.483 0.077 0.846 1.096 0.620
Transport 2.082 1.132 0.157 1.726 1.071 1.086
Machinery and electronics 1.133 0.921 0.148 1.781 1.353 1.265
Metallic products and other
manufactures 0.781 0.866 0.141 1.849 1.783 1.269
Services 0.861 0.369 0.054 0.146 0.120 0.113
After trade liberalisation
Crops –0.123 –2.739  –0.464 0.040 2.352 –0.043
Non-crop agriculture –0.040 –1.979 –0.333 2.095 2.877 1.352
Mining, energy and non-metallic
products 0.036 –0.953 –0.170 –1.603 2.951 –0.739
Textiles and clothing 0.625 0.655 0.170 4.885 3.787 3.195
Wood and wood products 0.316 0.873 0.169 3.521 2.643 2.324
Chemicals 0.251 0.685 0.109 1.812 1.981 1.358
Transport 0.606 3.314 0.526 7.459 5.526 4.950
Machinery and electronics 0.568 1.577 0.288 4.123 3.246 2.951
Metallic products and other
manufactures 0.503 1.298 0.219 3.889 3.763 2.687
Services 0.171 1.204 0.312 3.710 2.980 2.790
Note: CHN=China; AUS=Australia; see Table 1 for other terms.
The sector structural adjustment index is defined as the change in production of a 1 per cent
change in endowment.
Source: GTAP simulation results.
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Table 7 The effect of public investment in China (per cent)
QO QXW QIM QXS(CHN–AUS)
Crops –1.007 –5.417 2.055 –5.454
Non-crop agriculture –0.964 –3.885 1.436 –3.957
Mining, energy and non-metallic
products –0.565 –0.334 1.657 –0.343
Textiles and clothing 0.229 0.515 –0.347 0.436
Wood and wood products –0.161 0.767 –0.699 0.758
Chemicals –0.222 0.324 –0.479 0.317
Transport 0.482 3.348 –1.502 3.340
Machinery and electronics 0.418 1.696 –0.924 1.669
Metallic products and other
manufactures 0.298 1.122 –0.524 1.082
Services –0.303 1.083 –1.017 1.257
Note: The shock variable is indirectly used.
QO=total output; QXW=exports; QIM=imports; QXS (CHN–AUS)=exports from China to
Australia.
Source: Model simulation.
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Appendix 1 The structure of a standard computable general
equilibrium model
Generally, the specification of the general model is divided into nine components: final demand
behaviour, production technology, factor supplies and demands, treatment of traded goods,
domestic prices, domestic market equilibrium, income and government revenue, foreign sector
closure, and macro closure. Here, I just list the basic equations.
 Final demand behaviour
The basic model considers domestic final demand using a linear expenditure system (LES),
which includes household consumption, government demand, and investment demand.
iPYmpssPCP
h
h
Q
hii
Q
ii
Q
i ∀


−−+= ∑ µµ )1( (A1.1)
where Ci  represents household demand for composite consumption good i, Pi
Q denotes the
domestic purchaser price of the composite consumption good I, si is the marginal budget share
for composite good i, mps is the marginal propensity to save, Y is domestic income, and µi  is the
subsistence minimum for composite consumption good i. The function form is
iIisI ii ∀= (A1.2)
iGgsG ii ∀= (A1.3)
where I and G are total investment and government demand, respectively, and isi and gsi
are the share of the total investment and government demand each sector receives.
Production technology
Production technology is modelled by using a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) value-
added function specified as:
iKbLbaX iiiii iiiiii ∀−+= −−− )1/(/)1(/)1( ))1(( φφφφφφ (A1.4)
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where Xi denotes gross domestic output for sector I, Li is labour used in sector i, Ki is capital
used in sector i and fi is the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital for sector i. The
parameter fi is exogenous and is estimated outside the model. The parameters ai and bi are the
respective intercept and share parameters that allow the CES production function to be
calibrated for each sector i.
A Leontief function is assumed for intermediate products:
iXioD
h
hihi ∀=∑ (A1.5)
where Di is the intermediate demand for composite consumption good i, Xh is the gross
domestic output of sector h, and ioih is the input–output coefficient between sectors I and h.
 Factor supplies and demands
Factor demands are derived from the CES production:
i
w
Pb
XaL ii
V
ii
iii ∀=
− φφ )()1( (A1.6)
i
r
Pb
XaK ii
V
ii
iii ∀
−
=
− φφ ])1([)1( (A1.7)
where Pi
V is the value added price in sector i, w is the economy-wide wage rate, and r is
the economy-wide rental rate on capital.
 Treatment of traded goods
The import composition of domestic demand is influenced by the ratio of domestic and import
prices, as well as by any administrative quantity restrictions. The model aggregates imports
and their domestic counterparts into an aggregate good for each sector, Qi , using a CES function
iSMQ iiiiii iiiiii ∀−+= −−− σσσσσσ ββα /)1(/)1(/)1( ])1([ (A1.8)
i
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P
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i
S
i
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i
i
i ∀
−
=
σ
β
β )])()1([()( (A1.9)
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where Qi denotes the composite good for domestic consumption in sector i, Mi is imports
of sector i and Si is the domestic supply in sector i.
Domestic prices
In this sector, the equations are as follows:
iEPSPXP i
E
ii
S
ii
X
i ∀+= (A1.10)
iMPSPQP iMiiSiiQi ∀+= (A1.11)
iPioPP
h
Q
hhi
X
i
V
i ∀−= ∑ (A1.12)
ierPWtP Miii
M
i ∀++= )1)(1( ρ (A1.13)
ierPWP Ei
E
i ∀= (A1.14)
where ti is the tariff rate on imports in sector i, iρ is the quota premium rate in sector i,
PWi
E is the world price of the import good in sector i, and er is the exchange rate.
Domestic market equilibrium
Three equations are required for domestic market equilibrium, one for the commodity market
and two others for the factor markets:
iIGCDQ iiiii ∀+++= (A1.15)
∑ =
i
i KK (A1.16)
∑ =
i
i LL (A1.17)
Income and government revenue
Income and government revenue are summarised by the following six equations:
)1( i
i
i
M
ii
T t
MPt
R
+
=
∑
(A1.18)
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∑=
i
i
M
iiQ MerPWR ρ (A1.19)
QKL RGTYYY +++= (A1.20)
∑ =++
i
Ti
Q
i RGTGSGP (A1.21)
erFSGSmpsYS ++= (A1.22)
∑=
i
i
Q
i IPI (A1.23)
where RT is tariff revenue and RQ is quota rents.
Foreign sector closure
The balance of payment equation is:
∑∑ +=+
i
i
E
i
Q
i
i
M
i FSEPW
er
R
MPW (A1.24)
Macro closure
The macro closure must be specified according to the specific purpose. For more information, see
Hertel (1997).
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Appendix 2 Modifications to the model
Modifications to improve the accuracy of the model for the long run
In the long run assumption developed by Walmsley (1998), the closure assumes that the
differences in the expected rates of return across regions are explained using different risk
premiums. Therefore, the current rate of return in region r (RORCUR(r)) is equal to the risk-
free rate of return (RORCFREE(r)) plus a premium for risk (RISK(r)).
)()()( rRISKrRORCFREErRORCUR += (A2.1)
Similarly, the expected rate of return (ROREXP(r)) is equal to a risk-free return
(ROREFREE(r)) plus risk premium (RISK(r)).
)()()( rRISKrROREFREErROREXP += (A2.2)
The relationship between the expected and current rates of return is now between the risk-
free components of these rates of return.
)(
)(
)()()(
rRORFLEX
AVGROWTHrKB
rKE
rRORCFREErROREFREE
−



×
×= (A2.3)
Thus, the risk-free component of expected rated of return (ROREFREE(r)) is from the real
rate across all regions, while the growth rate differs across regions. The current rate of return
is determined by both the rental price and the cost.
Furthermore, combining functions A2.1–A2.3 with the relationship between end-of-
period capital and beginning-of-period capital (functions A1.4–A1.6), the capital stock in the
long run simulation is finally determined endogenously.16
)()()( rKBrKBGROWTHrKE ×= (A2.4)
)(
)(1)(
rVKB
rNETINV
rKBGROWTH += (A2.5)
∑
∈
×=
REGr
rKBGROWTH
GLOBKB
rVKBAVGROWTH )()( (A2.6)
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In this paper, I assume that a shock does not affect the risk component of the current rate
of return.17  As a result, the absolute change in the current rate of return must equal the absolute
change in the risk-free component of current rate of return for each region.
)()()()( rrorcfrRORCFREErrorcrRORCUR ×=× (A2.7)
For more details, including the definition of variables and function explanation, see
Walmsley (1998).
Separating government investment and private investment
In the original GTAP model, for convenience, the gross investment is defined as the function of
the market price for capital goods. Here I separate it into two parts – government investment
and private investment – by CES function in order to examine the impact of public investment.
Assume that the total supply of investment is constant,18  while the demand of investment
satisfies the CES function. The marginal rate of substitution between government investment
and private investment is supposed to be 1.19  After linearising, the linear functions are:
)]()([)()( rpgcgdsrpcgdssigmarqcgdsrqgcgds −×−= (A2.8)
)]()([)()( rppcgdsrpcgdssigmarqcgdsrqpcgds −×−= (A2.9)
The total price for capital goods is the average of public and private investment.
)()(/)(1[)()](/)([)( rppcgdsrREGINVrREGINGrpggdsrREGINVrREGINVGrpcgds ×−+×=
(A2.10)
Next, the separation is only determined by the spread between the public and private
investment price. Obviously, the price of private investment is determined at market:
),()](/),([,_,{)( rhpsrREGINVrhVOACOMMCGDhsumrppcgds ×= (A2.11)
where ppcgds(r) is the market price for private investment.
However, for government investment, the price is defined according to Harberger (1971)
and Harberger and Jenkins (1998), where social welfare is considered. According to the theory
of public finance, the price for public goods should not be determined by market price, since there
are some extra benefits that are omitted by private sectors. Hence, the real price should be a
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shadow price. As mentioned by Harberger (1971), it is a synthetic result of private return and
social return. Here I just adjust it with the total social welfare by using a new index that discounts
the social benefit. It is:
)()(
1)( rPPCGDS
rSPI
rPGCGDS ×= (A2.12)
where20
)(
)()(
rRENTAL
rWEN
rSPI = (A2.13)
Finally, the determination of the shadow price for government investment is a change
function:
)()()()()( rgovinvrppcgdsrrentalrwverpgcgds +++−= (A2.14)
where wve(r) is the change rate of social welfare and rental(r) is the discounting rate in
region r.
Additionally, a new shock variable is added to the qcgds(r) to express the government
investment policy, which is exogenous to the model.21
Table A2 Exogenous variables for closure in the GTAP model: static and dynamic
Macroeconomy closure in the short run Macroeconomy closure in the long run
Pop Pop
profitslack Incomeslack Endwslack Profitslack incomeslack endwslack
cgdslack saveslack govslack  tradslack Cgdslack saveslack govslack
psaveslack Tradslack psaveslack
Ao af afe ava atr Ao af afe ava atr
To txs tms tx tm To txs tms tx tm
Tf tpm tpd tgm tgd tfm tfd Tf tpm tpd tgm tgd tfm tfd
psave govsve psave rsk
qo(ENDWM_COMM,REG) qo(‘lab’, REG) qo(‘slab’, ‘REG’)
qo(ENDWS_COMM,’ROW’) Growavslack kbgrow avgrow growth
Source: GTAP model simulation.
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Notes
1  The five countries are the United States, Japan, Canada, China and Australia.
2 See Singh et al. (1986).
3 Since the mechanism used here is an indirect one, the new variable ‘govinvest’ is an
estimate of the shadow price and is therefore exogenous.
4 Created from the simulation of the GTAP file TMS.txt.
5 The subregional arrangements are the tariff cuts within subregions, such as NAFTA
and ASEAN.
6 The aggregation can be used to simulate the subregional tariff cuts, since we can make
use of the relationships within the new data. Of course, it is better to make such a
simulation in a structure with more disaggregated country groups. However, the
software that I used restricts the dimension of the simulation.
7 Thamels et al. (1999).
8 Since the EVSL process was not actually implemented, I used the real MFN tariff cuts
for APEC members from 1996 to 2000 as the basis for the shock of trade liberalisation
in the APEC region. On the one hand, it embodied the characteristics of EVSL; on the
other hand, it reflected the real process of trade liberalisation after EVSL in the APEC
region.
9 The more China exports, the less revenue it will get, because trade conditions will
worsen.
10 Mainly wool and woollen products; see Elek (1992).
11 From decreased exports in the short run to increased exports in the long run.
12 For products exported from China to Australia, FOB decreases by 2.18 per cent, CIF by
only 0.54 per cent.
13 Since the world price for wood and wood products is increasing considerably.
14 See Table 7. The production elasticity of factor endowments in this sector increases
quickly after a free trade shock.
15 This is a typical dual economic characteristic in China.
16  As defined in Francois et al. (1997), the investment is decided by  )(
0
1
01 K
KII =  where K1
and I1 are the end-of-period capital and investment and K0 and I0 are beginning-of-period
capital and investment.
17 See Walmsley (1998).
18 Due to the macroeconomy closure condition, the ‘total investment’ should be equal to
the ‘total saving’, which has nothing to do with the separation of investment. Thus, in
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analysis of investment, we can treat it as a constant variable. However, it is endogenous
within the model.
19 I here assume that the government has the same efficiency as the private sector. Of
course, a more realistic assumption should be based on the estimation of this ratio and
the result from sensitivity analysis.
20 The social welfare term, WEN(r), is calculated using the equivalent variation method
used in the normal GTAP model. Here I assume that the decision of the government is
based on the total social welfare.
21 The variable govinv(r) is an indirect variable for quantity of investment.
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